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Abstract
The notion of interchangeability has been introduced by John Nash in
one of his original papers on equilibria. This paper studies properties of
Nash equilibria interchangeability in cellular games that model behavior
of infinite chain of homogeneous economic agents. The paper shows that
there are games in which strategy of any given player is interchangeable
with strategies of players in an arbitrary large neighborhood of the given
player, but is not interchangeable with the strategy of a remote player
outside of the neighborhood. The main technical result is a sound and
complete logical system describing universal properties of interchangeabil-
ity common to all cellular games.
1 Introduction
Cellular Games. An one-dimensional cellular automaton is an infinite row
of cells that transition from one state to another under certain rules. The rules
are assumed to be identical for all cells. Usually, rules are chosen in such a way
that the next state of each cell is determined by the current states of the cell
itself and its two neighboring cells.
Harjes and Naumov [2] introduced an object similar to cellular automaton
that they called cellular game. They proposed to view each cell as a player,
whose pay-off function depends on the strategy of the cell itself and the strategies
of its two neighbors. The cellular games are homogeneous in the sense that
all players of a given game have the same pay-off function. Such games can
model rational behavior of linearly-spaced homogeneous agents. Linearly-spaced
economies have been studied by economists before [9].
Consider an example of a cellular game that we call G1. In this game each
player has only three strategies. We identify these strategies with congruence
classes [0], [1], and [2] of Z3. Each player is rewarded for either matching the
strategy of her left neighbor or choosing strategy one more (in Z3) than the
strategy of the left neighbor. An example of a Nash equilibrium in this game is
shown on Figure 1.
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[0] [1] [2] [0] [0] [1] [2] [2] [0] [1] [1] [2]
+[1] +[1] +[1] +[0] +[1] +[1]
+[1] +[0] +[1] +[1] +[0]
Figure 1: A Nash equilibrium of game G1.
Interchangeability. The notion of interchangeability goes back to one of
Nash’s original papers [6] on equilibria in strategic games. Interchangeability is
easiest to define in a two-player game: players in such a game are interchange-
able if for any two equilibria 〈a1, b1〉 and 〈a2, b2〉, strategy profiles 〈a1, b2〉 and
〈a2, b1〉 are also equilibria. Players in any two-player zero-sum game are inter-
changeable [6].
Consider now a multiplayer game with set of players P . We say that players
p ∈ P and q ∈ P are interchangeable if for any two equilibria 〈e′i〉i∈P and 〈e′′i 〉i∈P
of the game, there is equilibrium 〈ei〉i∈P of the same game such that ep = e′p
and eq = e
′′
q . We denote this by p ‖ q. For example, it is easy to see that for
the game described in the previous section, players p and q are interchangeable
if there are not adjacent. In other words, p ‖ q if and only if |p − q| > 1. This
is the relation whose properties in cellular games we study in this paper.
We now consider another game, that we call G2. Each player in game G2
can either pick a strategy from Z3 or switch to playing matching pennies game
with both of her neighbors. In the latter case, the strategy is a pair (y1, y2),
where y1, y2 ∈ {head, tail}. Value y1 is the strategy in the matching pennies
game against the left neighbor and value y2 is the strategy against the right
neighbor.
If the left and the right neighbors of a player choose, respectively, elements
x and z from set Z3 such that z − x ∈ {[0], [1]}, then the player is not paid no
matter what her strategy is. Otherwise, player is rewarded to start matching
pennies games with both neighbors. If two adjacent players both play matching
pennies game, then player on the right is rewarded to match the penny of the
player on the left and player on the left is rewarded to mismatch the penny of
the player on the right. An example of a Nash equilibria in such game is shown
on Figure 2. The set of all Nash equilibria of this game consists of all strategy
profiles in which each player chooses an element of Z3 in such a way that for
each player p player p+ 2 never chooses strategy that is two-more (in Z3) than
the strategy of player p. An interesting property of this game (see Theorem 3)
is that p ‖ q if and only if |p− q| 6= 2 and p 6= q. Thus, any two adjacent players
are interchangeable, but players that are two-apart are not interchangeable.
Note that we have achieved this by using each player to synchronize strategies
of her two neighbors. The ability of a player to do this significantly relies on
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[0] [2] [0] [0] [1] [0] [2] [1] [2] [2] [0] [2]
+[0] +[1] +[1] +[0] +[1]
+[1] +[0] +[1] +[1] +[0]
Figure 2: A Nash equilibrium of game G2.
the fact that pay-off function of each player is computed based on the choice
of strategies by the player herself and her two adjacent neighbors. A player
can not synchronize in the same way strategies of the players that are 2-players
away to the left and 2-players away to the right. Thus, it would be natural
to assume that it is impossible to construct a cellular game in which players,
say 1000-players away, are non-interchangeable, but players that are closer are
interchangeable. If this hypothesis is true, then the following property is true
for all cellular games:
p ‖ (p+ 1) ∧ p ‖ (p+ 2) ∧ · · · ∧ p ‖ (p+ 999)→ p ‖ (p+ 1000). (1)
The main surprising result of this paper is that such game does exist. Namely,
we prove that for any n ≥ 1 there is a cellular game Gn in which any two play-
ers p and q are interchangeable if and only if |p − q| = n. The construction of
such game for n > 2 is non-trivial. Strategies of players in our game are special
(n− 1)× 2 matrices of elements from Zn+1.
Another way to state our result is to say that statement (1) is not a universal
property of cellular games. Naturally, one can ask what statements are universal
properties of all cellular games. We answer this question by giving a sound and
complete axiomatization of such properties consisting of just the following three
axioms:
1. Reflexivity: a ‖ a→ a ‖ b,
2. Homogeneity: a ‖ b→ (a+ c) ‖ (b+ c),
3. Symmetry: a ‖ b→ b ‖ a.
The proof of completeness takes multiple instances of the discussed above cel-
lular game Gn and combines them into a single cellular game needed to finish
the proof.
The interchangeability relation between players of multi-player game could
be further generalized to a relation between two sets of players. Properties of
this relation are completely axiomatizable [7] by Geiger, Paz, and Pearl ax-
ioms originally proposed to describe properties of independence in the proba-
bility theory [1]. The same axioms also describe properties of Sutherland’s [10]
nondeducibility relation in information flow theory [4] and of a non-interference
3
relation in concurrency theory [5]. Naumov and Simonelli [8] described inter-
changeability properties between two sets of players in zero-sum games.
Functional Dependence. Our work is closely related to paper by Harjes and
Naumov [2] on functional dependence in cellular games. Strategy of player p
functionally determines strategy of player q in a cellular game if any two Nash
equilibria of the game that agree on player p also agree on player q. We denote
this by p B q. The functional dependence relation between players can not be
expressed through interchangeability and vice versa. Harjes and Naumov gave
complete axiomatization of functional dependence relation for cellular games
with finite set of strategies:
1. Reflexivity: aB a,
2. Transitivity: aB b→ (bB c→ aB c),
3. Homogeneity: aB b→ (a+ c)B (b+ c),
4. Symmetry: aB b→ bB a.
In spite of certain similarity between these axioms and our axioms for inter-
changeability, the proofs of completeness are very different. The completeness
proof techniques used by Harjes and Naumov is based on properties of Fibonacci
numbers and, to the best of our knowledge, can not be adopted to our setting.
Similarly, the (n−1)×2-matrix based game Gn that we use in the current paper
can not be used to prove the results obtained in [2].
The paper is structured as following. In Section 2, we give the formal defini-
tion of a cellular game and introduce formal syntax and semantics of our theory.
In Section 3, we list the axioms of out logical systems and review some related
notations. In Section 4, we prove soundness of this logical system. The rest of
the paper is dedicated to the proof of completeness. In Section 5.1, Section 5.2,
and Section 5.3, we define special cases of the game Gn for n = 0, 1, 2 and prove
their key properties. Games G1 and G2 has already been informally discussed
above. In Section 8 we give general definition of Gn for n ≥ 3 and prove its
properties. We combine results about games Gn for all n ≥ 0 in Section 5.5. In
Section 5.7, we introduce a very simple game G∞ and prove its properties. In
Section 5.6, we define a product operation on cellular games that can be used
to combine several cellular games into one. In Section 5.8, we use the product
of multiple games Gn to finish the proof of completeness. Section 6 concludes.
2 Syntax and Semantics
In this section we formally define cellular games, Nash equilibrium, and intro-
duce the formal syntax and the formal semantics of our logical system. The
definition of interchangeability predicate a ‖ b is a part of the formal semantics
specification in Definition 4 below.
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Definition 1 Let Φ be the minimal set of formulas that satisfies the following
conditions:
1. ⊥ ∈ Φ,
2. a ‖ b ∈ Φ for each integer a, b ∈ Z,
3. if ϕ ∈ Φ and ψ ∈ Φ, then ϕ→ ψ ∈ Φ.
Definition 2 Cellular game is a pair (S, u), where
1. S is any set of “strategies”,
2. u is a “pay-off” function from S3 to the set of real numbers R.
The domain of the function u in the above definition is S3 because the pay-off
of each player is determined by her own strategy and the strategies of her two
neighbors. By a strategy profile of a cellular game (S, u) we mean any tuple
〈si〉i∈Z such that si ∈ S for each i ∈ Z.
Definition 3 A Nash equilibrium of a game (S, u) is any strategy profile 〈ei〉i∈Z
such that u(ei−1, s, ei+1) ≤ u(ei−1, ei, ei+1), for each i ∈ Z and each s ∈ S.
By NE(G) we denote the set of all Nash equilibria of a cellular game G.
Lemma 1 For each k ∈ Z, if 〈ei〉i∈Z is a Nash equilibrium of a cellular game,
then 〈ei+k〉i∈Z is a Nash equilibrium of the same game. 
Definition 4 For any formula ϕ ∈ Φ and any cellular game G, relation G  ϕ
is defined recursively as follows:
1. G 2 ⊥,
2. G  a ‖ b if and only if for each 〈e′i〉i∈Z ∈ NE(G) and each 〈e′′i 〉i∈Z ∈
NE(G), there is 〈ei〉i∈Z ∈ NE(G) such that ea = e′a and eb = e′′b ,
3. G  ψ → χ if and only if G 2 ψ or G  χ.
3 Axioms
Our logical system, in addition to propositional tautologies in the language Φ
and the Modus Ponens inference rule, contains the following axioms:
1. Reflexivity: a ‖ a→ a ‖ b,
2. Homogeneity: a ‖ b→ (a+ c) ‖ (b+ c),
3. Symmetry: a ‖ b→ b ‖ a.
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We write ` ϕ if formula ϕ is provable in our logical system. The next lemma
gives an example of a proof in our logical system. This lemma will later be used
in the proof of the completeness theorem.
Lemma 2 If |a− b| = |c− d|, then ` a ‖ b→ c ‖ d.
Proof. Due to Symmetry axiom, without loss of generality we can assume that
a > b and c > d. Thus, assumption |a− b| = |c− d| implies that a− b = c− d.
Hence, c− a = d− b. Then, by Homogeneity axiom,
` a ‖ b→ (a+ (c− a)) ‖ (b+ (d− b)).
In other words, ` a ‖ b→ c ‖ d. 
4 Soundness
Soundness of propositional tautologies and Modus Ponens inference rules is
straightforward. We prove soundness of each of the remaining axioms of our
logical system as a separate lemma.
Lemma 3 (reflexivity) If G  a ‖ a, then G  a ‖ b for each a, b ∈ Z.
Proof. Let 〈e′i〉i∈Z ∈ NE(G) and 〈e′′i 〉i∈Z ∈ NE(G), we need to show that there
exists 〈ei〉i∈Z ∈ NE(G) such that ea = e′a and eb = e′′b . Indeed, by assumption
G  a ‖ a, there exists 〈e′′′i 〉i∈Z ∈ NE(G) such that e′′′a = e′a and e′′′a = e′′a. Thus,
e′a = e
′′
a. Take 〈ei〉i∈Z ∈ NE(G) to be 〈e′′i 〉i∈Z ∈ NE(G). Then ea = e′′a = e′a
and eb = e
′′
b . 
Lemma 4 (homogeneity) If G  a ‖ b, then G  (a + c) ‖ (b + c), for each
a, b, c ∈ Z.
Proof. Let 〈e′i〉i∈Z ∈ NE(G) and 〈e′′i 〉i∈Z ∈ NE(G), we need to show that there
exists 〈ei〉i∈Z ∈ NE(G) such that ea+c = e′a+c and eb+c = e′′b+c. By Lemma 1,
〈e′i+c〉i∈Z ∈ NE(G) and 〈e′′i+c〉i∈Z ∈ NE(G). Then, by assumption G  a ‖ b,
there exists 〈e′′′i 〉i∈Z ∈ NE(G) such that e′′′a = e′a+c and e′′′b = e′′b+c. Lemma 1
implies that 〈e′′′i−c〉i∈Z ∈ NE(G). Take 〈ei〉i∈Z ∈ NE(G) to be 〈e′′′i−c〉i∈Z. Then,
ea+c = e
′′′
(a+c)−c = e
′′′
a = e
′
a+c and eb+c = e
′′′
(b+c)−c = e
′′′
b = e
′′
b+c. 
Lemma 5 (symmetry) If G  a ‖ b, then G  b ‖ a for each a, b ∈ Z.
Proof. Let 〈e′i〉i∈Z ∈ NE(G) and 〈e′′i 〉i∈Z ∈ NE(G). We need to show that there
is 〈ei〉i∈Z ∈ NE(G) such that eb = e′b and ea = e′′a. Indeed, by assumption
G  a ‖ b, there exists 〈ei〉i∈Z ∈ NE(G) such that ea = e′′a and eb = e′b. 
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5 Completeness
In this section we prove completeness of our logical system by showing that for
each formula ϕ such that 0 ϕ there exists a cellular game G such that G 2 ϕ.
The game G will be constructed as a composition of multiple cellular “mini”
games Gn. Throughout this paper, by [k]n we mean the equivalence class of k
modulo n. In other words, [k]n ∈ Zn. We sometimes omit subscript n in the
expression [k]n if the value of the subscript is clear from the context. While
proving properties of the game Gn, we will find useful the following technical
lemma:
Lemma 6 For any n ≥ 1, any u, v ∈ Zn, and any k ≥ n, there is a sequence
of classes z1, . . . , zk ∈ Zn such that
1. z1 = u,
2. zk = v,
3. zi+1 − zi ∈ {[0]n, [1]n} for each i < k.

5.1 Game G0
We start with a very simple game G0.
Definition 5 Let G0 be pair (Z2, 0), where pay-off function is constant 0.
Lemma 7 The set of all Nash equilibria of the game G0 is set of all possible
strategy profiles of this game. 
Theorem 1 G0  a ‖ b if and only if a 6= b.
Proof. (⇒) : Suppose that G0  a ‖ b and a = b. Consider strategy profiles
〈e′k〉k∈Z and 〈e′′k〉k∈Z such that e′k = [0] and e′′k = [1] for each k ∈ Z. By Lemma 7,
strategy profiles 〈e′k〉k∈Z and 〈e′′k〉k∈Z are Nash equilibria of the game G0. Thus,
by the assumption G0  a ‖ b, there must exist Nash equilibrium 〈ek〉k∈Z such
that ea = e
′
a and eb = e
′
b. Recall that a = b. Thus, [0]2 = e
′
a = ea = eb = e
′′
b =
[1]2, which is a contradiction.
(⇐) : Assume that a 6= b and consider any two Nash equilibria 〈e′k〉k∈Z and
〈e′′k〉k∈Z of the game G0. We need to show that there is Nash equilibrium
〈ek〉k∈Z such that ea = e′a and eb = e′′b . Indeed, consider strategy profile 〈ek〉k∈Z
such that
ek =

e′a if k = a,
e′′b if k = b,
[0]2 otherwise.
By Lemma 7, strategy profile 〈ek〉k∈Z is a Nash equilibrium of the game G0. 
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5.2 Game G1
Let us now recall from the introduction the definition of game Gn for n = 1
and prove its important property. Each player in this game has only three
strategies. We identify these strategies with congruence classes in Z3. Each
player is rewarded if she either matches the strategy of her left neighbor or
chooses the strategy one more (in Z3) than the strategy of the left neighbor.
This is formally specified by the definition below.
Definition 6 Let game G1 be pair (Z3, u), where
u(x, y, z) =
{
1 if y 6= x+ [2]3,
0 otherwise.
An example of a Nash equilibrium of game G1 is depicted in Figure 1 in the
introduction.
Lemma 8 Strategy profile 〈ek〉k∈Z is a Nash equilibrium of the game G1 if and
only if ek − ek−1 ∈ {[0]3, [1]3} for each k ∈ Z. 
Theorem 2 G1  a ‖ b if and only if |a− b| > 1.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can assume that a ≤ b.
(⇒) First, suppose that a = b. Consider strategy profiles e′ = 〈e′k〉k∈Z and
e′′ = 〈e′′k〉k∈Z of the game G1 such that e′k = [0]3 and e′′k = [1]3 for each
k ∈ Z. By Lemma 8, e′, e′′ ∈ NE(G1). Assume that G1  a ‖ b, then there
must exist e = 〈ek〉k∈Z ∈ NE(G1) such that ea = e′a and eb = e′′b . Thus,
[0]3 = e
′
a = ea = eb = e
′′
b = [1]3, due to the assumption a = b. Therefore,
[0]3 = [1]3, which is a contradiction.
Next, assume that b = a+1. Consider strategy profile e′ = 〈e′k〉k∈Z such that
e′k = [0]3 for each k ∈ Z and strategy profile e′′ = 〈e′′k〉k∈Z such that e′′k = [2]3
for each k ∈ Z. By Lemma 8, e′, e′′ ∈ NE(G1). At the same time, due to the
same Lemma 8, there can not be e = 〈ek〉k∈Z ∈ NE(G1) such that ea = [0]3
and eb = ea+1 = [2]3. Therefore, G1 2 a ‖ b.
(⇐) Assume that |a − b| > 1. Thus, a + 1 < b due to the assumption a ≤ b.
Consider any two equilibria e′ = 〈e′k〉k∈Z and e′′ = 〈e′k〉k∈Z of game G1. We
will show that there is e = 〈ek〉k∈Z ∈ NE(G1) such that ea = e′a and eb = e′′b .
Indeed, since a + 1 < b, by Lemma 6, there must exist sequence of congruence
classes xa, xa+1, xa+2, . . . , xb in Z3 such that xk − xk−1 ∈ {[0]3, [1]3} for each
a < k ≤ b. Define strategy profile e = 〈ek〉k∈Z as
ek =

xa if k < a,
xk if a ≤ k ≤ b,
xb if b < k.
By Lemma 8, e ∈ NE(G1). 
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5.3 Game G2
We now recall definition of game Gn for n = 2 from the introduction. Each
player in this game can either pick a strategy from Z3 or switch to playing
matching pennies game with both of her neighbors. In the latter case, the
strategy is a pair (y1, y2), where y1, y2 ∈ {head, tail}. Value y1 is the strategy
in the matching pennies game against the left neighbor and value y2 is the
strategy against the right neighbor.
If the left and the right neighbors of a player choose, respectively, elements
x and z from set Z3 such that z−x ∈ {[0]3, [1]3}, then the player is not paid no
matter what her strategy is. Otherwise, player is rewarded to start matching
pennies games with both neighbors. If two adjacent players both play matching
pennies game, then player on the right is rewarded to match the penny of the
player on the left and player on the left is rewarded to mismatch the penny of
the player on the right. We formally capture the above description of the game
G2 in the following definition.
Definition 7 Let game G2 be pair (S, u), where
1. S = Z3 ∪ {head, tail}2. In other words, strategy of each player in this
game could be either a congruence class from Z3 or a pair (y1, y2) such
that each of u and v is either “head” or “tail”.
2. pay-off function u(x, y, z) = u1(x, y, z) + u2(x, y) + u3(y, z) is the sum of
three separate pay-offs specified below:
(a) if either at least one of x and z is not in Z3 or if they are both in Z3
and x + [2]3 = z, then pay-off u1(x, y, z) rewards player y not to be
an element of Z3:
u1(x, y, z) =
{
1 if y ∈ {head, tail}2,
0 otherwise.
in all other cases u1(x, y, z) is equal to zero.
(b) if both x = (x1, x2) and y = (y1, y2) are in {head, tail}2, then pay-off
u2(x, y) rewards player y if x2 = y1:
u2((x1, x2), (y1, y2)) =
{
1 if x2 = y1,
0 otherwise.
in all other cases u2(x, y) is equal to zero.
(c) if both y = (y1, y2) and z = (z1, z2) are in {head, tail}2, then pay-off
u3(y, z) rewards player y if y2 6= z1:
u2((y1, y2), (z1, z2)) =
{
1 if y2 6= z1,
0 otherwise.
in all other cases u3(y, z) is equal to zero.
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An example of a Nash equilibrium of the game G2 has been given in the intro-
duction in Figure 2.
Lemma 9 Strategy profile 〈ek〉k∈Z is a Nash equilibrium of game G2 if and only
if the following two conditions are satisfied:
1. ek ∈ Z3 for each k ∈ Z,
2. ek+2 − ek ∈ {[0]3, [1]3} for each k ∈ Z.

Theorem 3 G2  a ‖ b if and only if either |a− b| = 1 or |a− b| > 2.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that a ≤ b.
(⇒) First, assume that G2  a ‖ b and a = b. Consider strategy profiles
e′ = 〈e′k〉k∈Z and e′ = 〈e′′k〉k∈Z such that e′k = [0]3 and e′′k = [1]3 for each k ∈ Z.
Note that e′, e′′ ∈ NE(G2) by Lemma 9. Thus, by the assumption G2  a ‖ b,
there must exist e = 〈ek〉k∈Z such that ea = e′a = [0]3 and eb = e′′b = [1]3.
Hence, because a = b, we have [0]3 = ea = eb = [1]3, which is a contradiction.
Next, suppose that G2  a ‖ b and b = a + 2. Consider strategy profiles
e′ = 〈e′k〉k∈Z and e′ = 〈e′′k〉k∈Z such that e′k = [0]3 and e′′k = [2]3 for each k ∈ Z.
Note that e′, e′′ ∈ NE(G2) by Lemma 9. Thus, by the assumption G2  a ‖ b,
there must exist e = 〈ek〉k∈Z such that ea = e′a = [0]3 and ea+2 = eb = e′′b = [2]3,
which is a contradiction to Lemma 9.
(⇐) Assume now that f = 〈fk〉k∈Z and g = 〈gk〉k∈Z are two Nash equilibria
of the game G2. We need to show that there is an equilibrium f = 〈fk〉k∈Z of
the same game G2 such that ea = fa and eb = egb. Note that by Lemma 9,
fk, gk ∈ Z3 for each k ∈ Z and
fk+2 − fk ∈ {[0]3, [1]3}, (2)
gk+2 − gk ∈ {[0]3, [1]3}, (3)
for each k ∈ Z. We will consider two separate cases: b = a+ 1 and b > a+ 2.
fa-4 ga-3 fa-2 ga-1 fa ga+1 fa+2 ga+3 fa+4 ga+5 fa+6 ga+7
Figure 3: Nash equilibrium e = 〈ek〉k∈Z.
Case I. Suppose that b = a + 1. Consider (see Figure 3) strategy profile e =
〈ek〉k∈Z such that
ek =
{
fk if k ≡ a (mod 2),
gk if k ≡ a+ 1 (mod 2).
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Note that ek+2 − ek ∈ {[0]3, [1]3} for each k ∈ Z due statements (2) and (3).
Thus, by Lemma 9, strategy profile e is a Nash equilibrium of game G2. Note
that ea = fa and eb = ea+1 = ga+1 = gb.
Case II. Assume now that b > a + 2. Thus, b − a > 2. Hence, by Lemma 6,
there must exists za, za+1, . . . , zb ∈ Z3 such that za = fa, zb = gb, and zk+2 −
zk ∈ {[0]3, [1]3} for each k such that a ≤ k ≤ b − 2. Consider strategy profile
e = 〈ek〉k∈Z such that
ek =

za if k < a,
zk if a ≤ k ≤ b,
zb if b < k.
By Lemma 9, strategy profile e is a Nash equilibrium of the game G2. Note that
ea = za = fa and eb = zb = gb, by the choice of the sequence za, za+1, . . . , zb. 
5.4 Game Gn: general case
In this section we define game Gn for n ≥ 3. The set of strategies Sn of the game
Gn is (Zn+1 × Zn+1)n−1. We visually represent elements of Sn as (n − 1) × 2
matrices whose elements belong to Zn+1.
Definition 8 Pay-off function
u


x1,1 x1,2
x2,1 x2,2
...
...
xn−1,1 xn−1,2
 ,

y1,1 y1,2
y2,1 y2,2
...
...
yn−1,1 yn−1,2
 ,

z1,1 z1,2
z2,1 z2,2
...
...
zn−1,1 zn−1,2

 (4)
is equal to 1 if the following conditions are satisfied:
1. y1,1 = [0]n+1,
2. yk+1,2 + zk+1,1 − xk,2 − yk,1 ∈ {[0]n+1, [1]n+1}, for every 1 ≤ k < n− 1,
3. z1,2 − xn−1,2 − yn−1,1 ∈ {[0]n+1, [1]n+1}.
if at least one of the above conditions is not satisfied, then pay-off function (4)
is equal to 0.
5.4.1 Perfect strategy profiles
While describing properties of game Gn, it will be convenient to use terms
“perfect strategy profile” and “semi-perfect strategy profile” at a particular
player. We introduce the notion of a perfect profile in this section and the
notion of a semi-perfect profile in the next section.
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Definition 9 Strategy profile
〈 xi1,1 xi1,2xi2,1 xi2,2... ...
xin−1,1 x
i
n−1,2
〉i∈Z
of the game Gn, where n ≥ 3, is perfect at player i if
1. xi1,1 = [0]n+1,
2. xi−1k,2 + x
i
k,1 = x
i
k+1,2 + x
i+1
k+1,1 in Zn+1 for every 1 ≤ k < n− 1,
3. xi−1n−1,2 + x
i
n−1,1 = x
i+1
1,2 in Zn+1.
By a sum of two strategies in the game Gn, where n ≥ 3, we mean element-
wise sum of the two matrices.
Lemma 10 For any two strategy profiles 〈si〉i∈Zand 〈s′i〉i∈Z, of the game Gn
perfect at a player i ∈ Z, strategy profile 〈si + s′i〉i∈Z is also perfect at player
i. 
Proof. See Definition 9. 
Lemma 11 For any
M =

[0] x1,2
x2,1 x2,2
x3,1 x3,2
...
...
xn−2,1 xn−2,2
xn−1,1 xn−1,2

∈ (Zn+1 × Zn+1)n−1
and any a, b ∈ Z, if 0 < |a − b| < n, then there is a strategy profile s = 〈si〉i∈Z
of the game Gn such that
1. sa = M ,
2. sb =

[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
[0] [0]

,
3. strategy profile s is perfect at each player i such that a < i < b.
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Proof. We assume that a < b. The case b < a could be shown in a similar way.
Case b = a+ 1: Consider strategy profile s = 〈si〉i∈Z such that sa = M and all
other strategy are equal to 
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
[0] [0]

.
The third condition of the lemma is satisfied vacuously.
Case a+1 < b < a+n: Consider strategy profile s = 〈si〉i∈Z such that strategies
sa, sa+1, . . . , sb are equal to
[0] x1,2
x2,1 x2,2
x3,1 x3,2
x4,1 x4,2
...
...
xk−1,1 xk−1,2
xk,1 xk,2
xk+1,1 xk+1,2
xk+2,1 xk+2,2
...
...
xn−3,1 xn−3,2
xn−2,1 xn−2,2
xn−1,1 xn−1,2

,

[0] [0]
−x2,2 x1,2
−x3,2 [0]
−x4,2 [0]
...
...
−xk−1,2 [0]
−xk,2 [0]
−xk+1,2 [0]
−xk+2,2 [0]
...
...
−xn−3,2 [0]
−xn−2,2 [0]
−xn−1,2 [0]

,

[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] x1,2
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]

,
. . . ,

[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] x1,2
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]

,

[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
[0] x1,2
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]

,

[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]

13
respectively, where k = b− a. All other strategies are equal to
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]

.
By Definition 9, this profile is perfect at each player i such that a < i < b. 
5.4.2 Semi-perfect strategy profiles
Definition 10 Strategy profile
〈 xi1,1 xi1,2xi2,1 xi2,2... ...
xin−1,1 x
i
n−1,2
〉i∈Z
of the game Gn, where n ≥ 2, is semi-perfect at player i if
1. xi1,1 = [0]n+1,
2. xik+1,2 + x
i+1
k+1,1 − xi−1k,2 − xik,1 ∈ {[0]n+1, [1]n+1}, for every 1 ≤ k < n− 1,
3. xi+11,2 − xi−1n−1,2 − xin−1,1 ∈ {[0]n+1, [1]n+1}.
Lemma 12 For any
A =

[0] x1,2
x2,1 x2,2
...
...
xn−1,1 xn−1,2
 ∈ (Zn+1 × Zn+1)n−1,
any
B =

[0] y1,2
y2,1 y2,2
...
...
yn−1,1 yn−1,2
 ∈ (Zn+1 × Zn+1)n−1,
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and any a, b ∈ Z, if |a− b| > n, then there is a strategy profile s = 〈si〉i∈Z of the
game Gn such that
1. sa = A,
2. sb = B,
3. strategy profile s is semi-perfect at each player i such that a < i < b.
Proof. We will assume that a < b. The other case is similar. Thus, b − a > n
due to the assumption |a− b| > n. Let k be an integer such that 0 ≤ k < n− 1
and k ≡ b−a (mod n−1). We first consider case when k 6= 1. Since x1,2, yk,1 ∈
Zn+1, by Lemma 6, there must exist a sequence z1, z2, . . . , zb−a of equivalence
classes in Zn+1 such that
z1 = x1,2,
zb−a = yk,1, (5)
zi+1 − zi ∈ {[0]n+1, [1]n+1} (0 ≤ i < b− a). (6)
Consider now strategy profile s = 〈si〉i∈Z such that strategies sa, sa+1, . . . , sb
are equal to
[0] z1
x2,1 x2,2
x3,1 x3,2
x4,1 x4,2
...
...
xk−1,1 xk−1,2
xk,1 xk,2
xk+1,1 xk+1,2
...
...
xn−3,1 xn−3,2
xn−2,1 xn−2,2
xn−1,1 xn−1,2

,

[0] [0]
−x2,2 [0]
−x3,2 [0]
−x4,2 [0]
...
...
−xk−1,2 [0]
−xk,2 [0]
−xk+1,2 [0]
...
...
−xn−3,2 [0]
−xn−2,2 [0]
−xn−1,2 [0]

,

[0] [0]
z2 [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]

,

[0] [0]
[0] [0]
z3 [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]

, . . . ,

[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
zn−2 [0]
[0] [0]

,

[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
zn−1 [0]

,

[0] zn
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]

,

[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]

,

[0] [0]
zn+1 [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]

,
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
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
zn+2 [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]

, . . . ,

[0] [0]
[0] −y2,1
[0] −y3,1
[0] −y4,1
...
...
zb−a−1 −yk−1,1
[0] [0]
[0] −yk+1,1
...
...
[0] −yn−3,1
[0] −yn−2,1
[0] −yn−1,1

,

[0] y1,2
y2,1 y2,2
y3,1 y3,2
y4,1 y4,2
...
...
yk−1,1 yk−1,2
zb−a yk,2
yk+1,1 yk+1,2
...
...
yn−3,1 yn−3,2
yn−2,1 yn−2,2
yn−1,1 yn−1,2

respectively. All other strategies are equal
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
...
...
[0] [0]
[0] [0]
[0] [0]

.
Due to condition (6), this profile is semi-perfect at each player i such that
a < i < b. Case k = 1 is similar except that equation (5) should be replaced
with zb−a = yk,2. 
Lemma 13 (right expansion) For each a, b ∈ Z such that a < b, if strategy
profile s = 〈si〉i∈Z is semi-perfect for each player i such that a < i < b, then
there is a strategy profile s′ = 〈s′i〉i∈Z such that
1. s′i = si for each i such that a ≤ i ≤ b,
2. s′ is semi-perfect for each player i such that a < i < b+ 1.
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Proof. Let
sb−1 =

[0] x1,2
x2,1 x2,2
x3,1 x3,2
...
...
xn−2,1 xn−2,2
xn−1,1 xn−1,2

, sb =

[0] y1,2
y2,1 y2,2
y3,1 y3,2
...
...
yn−2,1 yn−2,2
yn−1,1 yn−1,2

.
Define s′i to be equal to si for all i 6= b+ 1 and s′b+1 to be
[0] xn−1,2 + yn−1,1
x1,2 − y2,2 [0]
x2,2 + y2,1 − y3,2 [0]
...
...
xn−3,2 + yn−3,1 − yn−2,2 [0]
xn−2,2 + yn−2,1 − yn−1,2 [0]

.
By Definition 10, strategy profile s′ is perfect at player b. 
Lemma 14 (left expansion) For each a, b ∈ Z such that a < b, if strategy
profile s = 〈si〉i∈Z is semi-perfect for each player i such that a < i < b, then
there is a strategy profile s′ = 〈s′i〉i∈Z such that
1. s′i = si for each i such that a ≤ i ≤ b,
2. s′ is semi-perfect for each player i such that a− 1 < i < b.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 13. 
Lemma 15 (infinite expansion) For each a, b ∈ Z such that a < b, if strat-
egy profile s = 〈si〉i∈Z is semi-perfect for each for player i such that a < i < b,
then there is a strategy profile s′ = 〈s′i〉i∈Z such that
1. s′i = si for each i such that a ≤ i ≤ b,
2. s′ is semi-perfect for each player i ∈ Z.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 13 and Lemma 14. 
5.4.3 Properties of Nash equilibria of game Gn
Lemma 16 For any n ≥ 3, strategy profile e is a Nash equilibrium of the game
Gn if and only if profile e is semi-perfect at each player i ∈ Z.
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Proof. See Definition 8 and Definition 10. 
Lemma 17 For any a ∈ Z and any n ≥ 3, if
〈 xi1,1 xi1,2xi2,1 xi2,2... ...
xin−1,1 x
i
n−1,2
〉i∈Z
is a Nash equilibrium of the game Gn and x
a
1,2 = [0]n+1, then
xa+kk+1,2 + x
a+k+1
k+1,1 ∈ {[0], [1], [2], . . . , [k]},
for each 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 2.
Proof. Induction on k. If k = 0, then xa+kk+1,2 = x
a
1,2 = [0] due to the assumption
of the lemma. At the same time, xa+k+1k+1,1 = x
a+1
1,1 = [0] by Lemma 16 and item
1 of Definition 10. Thus,
xa+kk+1,2 + x
a+k+1
k+1,1 = [0] + [0] = [0] ∈ {[0]}.
For the induction step, assume that
xa+kk+1,2 + x
a+k+1
k+1,1 ∈ {[0], [1], [2], . . . , [k]}.
By Lemma 16 and item 2 of Definition 10, there is ε ∈ {[0]n+1, [1]n+1} such that
xa+k+1k+3,2 + x
a+k+2
k+2,1 = x
a+k
k+1,2 + x
a+k+1
k+1,1 + ε.
Therefore,
xa+k+1k+3,2 + x
a+k+2
k+2,1 ∈ {[0], [1], [2], . . . , [k], [k + 1]}.

Lemma 18 For any a ∈ Z and any n ≥ 3, if
〈 xi1,1 xi1,2xi2,1 xi2,2... ...
xin−1,1 x
i
n−1,2
〉i∈Z
is a Nash equilibrium of the game Gn and x
a
1,2 = [0]n+1, then
xa+n1,2 ∈ {[0], [1], [2], . . . , [n− 1]}.
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Proof. By Lemma 17,
xa+n−2n−1,2 + x
a+n−1
n−1,1 ∈ {[0], [1], [2], . . . , [n− 2]}.
By Lemma 16 and item 3 of Definition 10, for i = a + n − 1, there is ε ∈
{[0]n+1, [1]n+1} such that
xa+n1,2 = x
a+n−2
n−1,2 + x
a+n−1
n−1,1 + ε.
Therefore, xa+n1,2 ∈ {[0], [1], [2], . . . , [n− 2], [n− 1]}. 
Definition 11 For any n ≥ 3, let fn = 〈fni 〉i∈Z be the strategy profile of the
game Gn such that
fni =

[0]n+1 [0]n+1
[0]n+1 [0]n+1
...
...
[0]n+1 [0]n+1
 ,
for each i ∈ Z.
Lemma 19 fn ∈ NE(Gn) for each n ≥ 3.
Proof. By Lemma 16 and Definition 10. 
Definition 12 For any n ≥ 3, let gn = 〈gni 〉i∈Z be the strategy profile of the
game Gn such that
gni =

[0]n+1 [n]n+1
[0]n+1 [n]n+1
...
...
[0]n+1 [n]n+1
 ,
for each i ∈ Z.
Lemma 20 gn ∈ NE(Gn) for each n ≥ 3.
Proof. By Lemma 16 and Definition 10. 
5.4.4 Main property of game Gn
Theorem 4 Gn  a ‖ b if and only if |a− b| 6= n and a 6= b, where n ≥ 3.
Proof. (⇒) : Let Gn  a ‖ b. First, suppose that |a − b| = n. Without loss of
generality, assume that b = a + n. Due to assumption Gn  a ‖ b, there must
exist an equilibrium
〈ei〉i∈Z = 〈 xi1,1 xi1,2xi2,1 xi2,2... ...
xin−1,1 x
i
n−1,2
〉i∈Z
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of the game Gn such that ea = f
n
a and eb = g
n
b , where f
n = 〈fni 〉i∈Z and
gn = 〈gni 〉i∈Z are Nash equilibria of the game Gn defined in the previous section.
Thus, xa1,2 = [0] and x
b
1,2 = [n], which is a contradiction to Lemma 18.
Assume now that a = b. Due to assumption Gn  a ‖ b, there must exist an
equilibrium e = 〈ei〉i∈Z of the game Gn such that fna = ea = eb = gnb . Thus,
[0]n+1 = [n]n+1, which is a contradiction.
(⇐) : Without loss of generality, assume that b > a. To prove that Gn  a ‖ b,
consider any two Nash equilibria
v = 〈vi〉i∈Z = 〈 [0] xi1,2xi2,1 xi2,2... ...
xin−1,1 x
i
n−1,2
〉i∈Z
and
w = 〈wi〉i∈Z = 〈 [0] yi1,2yi2,1 yi2,2... ...
yin−1,1 y
i
n−1,2
〉i∈Z
of the game Gn. Note that the upper left element in each of the above matrices is
[0] due to Lemma 16. We need to show that there is an equilibrium e ∈ NE(Gn)
such that e agrees with equilibrium v on the strategy of player a and with
equilibrium w on the strategy of player b.
Case I: b− a < n. By Lemma 11, there are strategy profiles 〈si〉i∈Z and 〈ti〉i∈Z
both perfect at each player i such that a < i < b and
sa =

[0] xa1,2
xa2,1 x
a
2,2
...
...
xan−1,1 x
a
n−1,2
 , sb =

[0]n+1 [0]n+1
[0]n+1 [0]n+1
...
...
[0]n+1 [0]n+1
 ,
ta =

[0]n+1 [0]n+1
[0]n+1 [0]n+1
...
...
[0]n+1 [0]n+1
 , tb =

[0] yb1,2
yb2,1 y
b
2,2
...
...
ybn−1,1 y
b
n−1,2
 .
By Lemma 10, strategy profile 〈si + ti〉i∈Z is perfect at each player i such that
a < i < b. Thus, by Lemma 15, there is a strategy profile 〈ei〉i∈Z of the game
Gn where ei = si + ti for each i such that a ≤ i ≤ b and ei is semi-perfect
for each player i ∈ Z. Hence, by Lemma 16, strategy profile 〈ei〉i∈Z is a Nash
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equilibrium of the game Gn. We are only left to notice that
ea = sa + ta =

[0] xa1,2
xa2,1 x
a
2,2
...
...
xan−1,1 x
a
n−1,2
+

[0]n+1 [0]n+1
[0]n+1 [0]n+1
...
...
[0]n+1 [0]n+1

=

[0] xa1,2
xa2,1 x
a
2,2
...
...
xan−1,1 x
a
n−1,2
 = va
and
eb = sb + tb =

[0]n+1 [0]n+1
[0]n+1 [0]n+1
...
...
[0]n+1 [0]n+1
+

[0] yb1,2
yb2,1 y
b
2,2
...
...
ybn−1,1 y
b
n−1,2

=

[0] yb1,2
yb2,1 y
b
2,2
...
...
ybn−1,1 y
b
n−1,2
 = wb.
Case II: b − a > n. By Lemma 12, there exists a strategy profile 〈si〉i∈Z such
that sa = va, sb = wb, and strategy profile 〈si〉i∈Z is semi-perfect at each player
i such that a < i < b. By Lemma 15, there is a strategy profile 〈ei〉i∈Z semi-
perfect at each player i ∈ Z such that ei = si for each a ≤ i ≤ b. By Lemma 16,
strategy profile 〈ei〉i∈Z is a Nash equilibrium of the game Gn. We are only left
to notice that ea = sa = va and eb = sb = wb. 
5.5 Combining games together
Theorem 5 For any n ≥ 0, and any a, b ∈ Z,
Gn  a ‖ b if and only if |a− b| 6= n and a 6= b.
Proof. See Theorem 1, Theorem 2, Theorem 3, and Theorem 4. 
Theorem 6 For any n ≥ 0, game Gn has at least one Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Case I: n = 0. Consider strategy profile e = 〈ek〉k∈Z such that ek = [0]2
for each k ∈ Z. By Lemma 7, strategy profile e is a Nash equilibrium of the
games G0.
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Case II: n = 1, 2. Consider strategy profile e = 〈ek〉k∈Z such that ek = [0]3 for
each k ∈ Z. By Lemma 8 and Lemma 9, strategy profile e is a Nash equilibrium
of the games G1 and G2.
Case III: n > 2. By Lemma 19, strategy profile fn is a Nash equilibrium of the
game Gn. 
5.6 Product of games
In this section we define product operation on cellular games. Informally, prod-
uct is a composition of several cellular games played concurrently and indepen-
dently. The pay-off of a player in the product of the games is the sum of the
pay-offs in the individual games.
Definition 13 Product
∏n
i=1G
i of any finite family of cellular games {Gi}ni=1 =
{(Si, ui)}ni=1 is the cellular game G = (S, u), where
1. S is Cartesian product
∏n
i=1 S
i,
2. u(〈xi〉i≤n, 〈yi〉i≤n, 〈zi〉i≤n) =
∑n
i=1 u
i(xi, yi, zi).
Lemma 21 If {Gi}ni=1 = {(Si, ui)}ni=1 is a finite family of cellular games, then
〈〈eik〉i≤n〉k∈Z ∈ NE(
∏n
i=1G
i) if and only if 〈eik〉k∈Z ∈ NE(Gi) for each i ≤ n.
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that ei0 = 〈ei0k 〉k∈Z /∈ NE(Gi) for some i0 ≤ n. Thus, there
is k0 ∈ Z and s ∈ Si0 such that
ui0(ei0k0−1, s, e
i0
k0+1
) > ui0(ei0k0−1, e
i0
k0
, ei0k0+1). (7)
Let tuple s be 〈e1k0 , e2k0 , . . . , ei0−1k0 , s, ei0+1k0 , . . . , enk0〉. Then, by Definition 13 and
due to inequality (7),
u(〈eik0−1〉i≤n, s, 〈eik0+1〉i≤n) =
∑
i 6=i0
ui(eik0−1, e
i
k0 , e
i
k0+1) + u
i0(ei0k0−1, s, e
i0
k0+1
) >
∑
i 6=i0
ui(eik0−1, e
i
k0 , e
i
k0+1) + u
i0(ei0k0−1, e
i0
k0
, ei0k0+1) =
∑
i
ui(eik0−1, e
i
k0 , e
i
k0+1) =
= u(〈eik0−1〉i≤n, 〈eik0〉i≤n, 〈eik0+1〉i≤n),
which is a contradiction with the assumption 〈〈eik〉i≤n〉k∈Z ∈ NE(
∏n
i=1G
i).
(⇐) Assume now that 〈〈eik〉i≤n〉k∈Z /∈ NE(
∏n
i=1G
i). Thus, there must exist
k ∈ Z and s = 〈si〉i≤n such that
u(〈eik0−1〉i≤n, s, 〈eik0+1〉i≤n) > u(〈eik0−1〉i≤n, 〈eik0〉i≤n, 〈eik0+1〉i≤n).
Hence, by Definition 13,∑
i
ui(eik0−1, s
i, eik0+1) >
∑
i
ui(eik0−1, e
i
k0 , e
i
k0+1).
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Thus, there must exist at least one i0 ≤ n such that
ui0(ei0k0−1, s
i0 , ei0k0+1) > u
i0(ei0k0−1, e
i0
k0
, ei0k0+1),
which is a contradiction with the assumption 〈ei0k 〉k∈Z ∈ NE(Gi0). 
Theorem 7 If a, b ∈ Z and each of the cellular games in family {Gi}ni=1 =
{(Si, ui)}ni=1 has at least one Nash equilibrium, then
∏n
i=1G
i  a ‖ b if and
only if Gi  a ‖ b for each i ≤ n.
Proof. (⇒) Let 〈e1k〉k∈Z, 〈e2k〉k∈Z, . . . , 〈enk 〉k∈Z be Nash equilibria of games
G1, G2, . . . , Gn that exist by the assumption of the theorem. Consider any
i0 ≤ n and any two equilibria 〈fk〉k∈Z and 〈gk〉k∈Z of the game Gi0 . We need
to show that there exists Nash equilibrium h = 〈hk〉k∈Z of the game Gi0 such
that ha = fa and hb = gb. Indeed, by Theorem 21,
〈〈e1k, e2k, . . . , ei0−1k , fk, ei0+1k , . . . , enk 〉〉k∈Z
and
〈〈e1k, e2k, . . . , ei0−1k , gk, ei0+1k , . . . , enk 〉〉k∈Z
are Nash equilibria of the game
∏n
i=1G
i. Hence, by the assumption
∏n
i=1G
i 
a ‖ b, there exists a Nash equilibrium
〈〈w1k, w2k, . . . , wi0−1k , wi0k , wi0+1k , . . . , wnk 〉〉k∈Z
of the game
∏n
i=1G
i such that
〈w1a, . . . , wi0−1a , wi0a , wi0+1a , . . . , wna 〉 = 〈e1a, . . . , ei0−1a , fa, ei0+1a , . . . , ena〉
and
〈w1b , . . . , wi0−1b , wi0b , wi0+1b , . . . , wnb 〉 = 〈e1b , . . . , ei0−1b , fb, ei0+1b , . . . , enb 〉.
In particular, wi0a = fa and w
i0
b = gb. At the same time, by Theorem 21,
〈wi0k 〉k∈Z is a Nash equilibrium of game Gi0 . Let h be 〈wi0k 〉k∈Z.
(⇐) Let 〈〈f1k , f2k , . . . , fnk 〉〉k∈Z and 〈〈g1k, g2k, . . . , gnk 〉〉k∈Z be two Nash equilib-
ria of the game
∏n
i=1G
i. We will prove that there is a Nash equilibrium
〈〈h1k, h2k, . . . , hnk 〉〉k∈Z of game
∏n
i=1G
i such that
〈h1a, h2a, . . . , hna〉 = 〈f1a , f2a , . . . , fna 〉
and
〈h1b , h2b , . . . , hnb 〉 = 〈g1b , g2b , . . . , gnb 〉.
Indeed, by Theorem 21, strategy profiles 〈f ik〉k∈Z and 〈gik〉k∈Z are Nash equilib-
ria of game Gi for each i ≤ n. Thus, due to the assumption of the theorem,
for each i ≤ n there exists Nash equilibrium 〈hik〉k∈Z of the game Gi such that
hia = f
i
a and h
i
b = g
i
b for each i ≤ n. By Theorem 21, 〈〈h1k, h2k, . . . , hnk 〉〉k∈Z is a
Nash equilibrium of the game
∏n
i=1G
i. 
23
5.7 Game G∞
Definition 14 Game G∞ is pair ({0}, 0), whose first element is the single-
element set containing number 0 and whose second component is the constant
function equal to 0.
Lemma 22 G∞  a ‖ b for each a, b ∈ Z.
Proof. Game G∞ has a unique strategy profile, which is also the unique Nash
equilibrium of this game. 
5.8 Completeness: final steps
We are now ready to state and prove the completeness theorem for our logical
system.
Theorem 8 (completeness) For each formula ϕ ∈ Φ, if G  ϕ for each
cellular game G, then ` ϕ.
Proof. Suppose that 0 ϕ. Let M be any maximal consistent subset of Φ such
that ¬ϕ ∈M . Thus, ϕ /∈M due to assumption of the consistency of M . There
are two cases that we consider separately.
Case I: 0 ‖ 0 ∈M .
Lemma 23 ψ ∈M if and only if G∞  ψ for each ψ ∈ Φ.
Proof. Induction on structural complexity of formula ψ. If ϕ is ⊥, then ψ /∈M
due to consistency of set M . At the same time, G∞ 2 ψ by Definition 4.
Suppose now that ψ is formula a ‖ b. By Reflexivity axiom, 0 ‖ 0 → a ‖ b.
Thus, a ‖ b ∈ M , by the assumption 0 ‖ 0 ∈ M and due to maximality of set
M . At the same time, G∞  a ‖ b by Lemma 22.
Finally, case when ψ is an implication σ → τ follows in the standard way
from maximality and consistency of set M and Definition 4. 
To finish the proof of the theorem, note that ϕ /∈ M implies, by the above
lemma, that G∞ 2 ϕ.
Case II: 0 ‖ 0 /∈ M . Let Sub(ϕ) be the finite set of all (p, q) ∈ Z2 such that
p ‖ q is a subformula of ϕ. Define game G to be∏
{G|p−q| | (p, q) ∈ Sub(ϕ) and p ‖ q /∈M}.
Lemma 24 For each subformula ψ of formula ϕ,
ψ ∈M if and only if G  ψ.
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Proof. Induction on structural complexity of formula ψ. If ϕ is ⊥, then ψ /∈M
due to consistency of set M . At the same time, G 2 ψ by Definition 4.
Next assume that ψ is an atomic formula a ‖ b.
(⇒) : Suppose first that a ‖ b ∈ M and G 2 a ‖ b. Thus, by Theorem 7
and Theorem 6, there must exist (p, q) ∈ Sub(ϕ) such that p ‖ q /∈ M and
G|p−q| 2 a ‖ b. Hence, by Theorem 5, either a = b or |p − q| = |a − b|. If
a = b, then assumption a ‖ b ∈ M implies that 0 ‖ 0 ∈ M due to Homogeneity
axiom and maximality of set M . The latter, however is contradiction with the
assumption of the case that we consider. If |p − q| = |a − b|, then a ‖ b ∈ M
implies p ‖ q ∈M by Lemma 2. The latter is a contradiction with the choice of
pair (p, q).
(⇐) : Suppose that a ‖ b /∈ M . Thus, G|a−b| 2 a ‖ b by Theorem 5. Hence,
G 2 a ‖ b by Theorem 7 and Theorem 6.
Case when ψ is an implication σ → τ follows in the standard way from
maximality and consistency of set M and Definition 4. 
To finish the proof of the theorem, note that ϕ /∈ M implies, by Lemma 24,
that G 2 ϕ. 
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown existence of cellular games in which Nash equilibria
are interchangeable for near-by players, but not interchangeable for far-away
players. We also gave complete axiomatization of all propositional properties
of interchangeability of cellular games. Possible next step in this work could
be axiomatization of properties of Nash equilibria for two-dimensional or even
circular cellular games. Circular economies has been studies in the economics
literature before [3].
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